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ABSTRACT: According to pragma-dialectical methodology, a party in an argumentative
discussion can be assumed to manoeuvre strategically between dialectical and rhetorical
objectives. One confrontational form of strategic manoeuvring occurs when a critic
charges an arguer with advancing a standpoint that has socially harmful consequences. In
special situations this form of manoeuvring can be dialectically sound, for example when
the standpoint is advanced in a way that damages the dialectical process. The boundary
between fallacious and dialectically sound applications of this form of manoeuvring is
examined by looking for the manoeuvring’s soundness conditions.
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1. INTRODUCTION1
A party in an argumentative discussion typically tries to achieve two
objectives. First, he aims at getting the best of the discussion. As a
protagonist he aims at persuading his antagonist of the acceptability
of his standpoint while as an antagonist he will try to convince the
protagonist to withdraw from defending his standpoint. Second, a par-
ty aims at keeping up the pretence of using only reasonable means of
persuasion, that is, he professes to put forward contributions that ad-
vance a discussion on the merits of the case. In the so-called pragma-
dialectical approach to argumentative discourse, these two objectives
have been labelled the rhetorical and the dialectical objectives (van
Eemeren and Houtlosser, 1999, 2002, 2003). The balancing of these
rhetorical and dialectical objectives is named strategic manoeuvring.
This paper deals with a form of strategic manoeuvring that has
played a prominent role in Dutch public debates about integration and
immigrations issues. The manoeuvring amounts to pointing out that
advancing a particular standpoint has harmful consequences and that,
for that reason, the standpoint must be retracted, or at least, not be
discussed any further. For example, when the politician Fortuyn
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asserted ‘‘The Islam is backward, ..., it is simply a backward culture’’,
a journalist responded with ‘‘You are stirring up hatred against for-
eigners’’. This is a form of confrontational manoeuvring in that the
apparent aims have to do with the confrontation stage of a critical dis-
cussion, that is, the stage where the parties confront each other with
their initial positions.
Such manoeuvring can easily derail into a fallacious attempt to shut
out the other party’s standpoint from the discussion. However, it
would be of no use to an arguer if it would not have at least the sem-
blance of reasonableness. In my presentation I will search for applica-
tions of this way of confrontational manoeuvring that are reasonable
in the dialectical sense of advancing the resolution of a diﬀerence of
opinion. I will end up with two plausible candidates of such dialecti-
cally sound manoeuvring. However, the main thrust of my argument
will be that such cases are exceptional: this way of manoeuvring de-
rails very easily into a fallacious contribution that hinders or even
block the resolution process. Before examining this form of manoeu-
vring, I will introduce the pragma-dialectical methodology of analysing
argumentative discourse.
2. STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING
According to pragma-dialectical methodology, as developed by van
Eemeren and Grootendorst in the 1980’s and 1990’s, argumentative
discourse is reconstructed and evaluated from the perspective of a crit-
ical discussion. According to this ideally reasonable procedure, a dis-
cussion starts from a diﬀerence of opinion and is exclusively aimed at
resolving this issue. The notion of dispute resolution is the central no-
tion that is elaborated in the explication of a critical discussion. A dif-
ference of opinion is only to be called resolved if both parties have
agreed on the issue, either in favour of the standpoint or in favour of
the other side, after having publicly tested the tenability of the stand-
point in the light of the critical questions and objections raised by the
antagonist.
The normative model speciﬁes that the parties, named the protago-
nist and the antagonist, need to go though four discussion stages. They
start with putting their diﬀerence of opinion into words in the confron-
tation stage. Then, in the opening stage, they have the opportunity to
agree on procedural and material starting points that can be used in
the next stage. In this stage, the argumentation stage, the parties ex-
change arguments and criticisms. They conclude the discussion in the
concluding stage by deciding whether the diﬀerence has been resolved,
and if so, in whose favour. In an ideally reasonable discussion, no
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moves occur that hinder or obstruct the ﬁnal aim of resolving the dif-
ference of opinion. With a set of ﬁfteen rules, van Eemeren and
Grootendorst specify this procedure (2004).
With the particulars of this critical procedure, the analyst has a
clear stance from which to reconstruct those components from the dis-
course that are relevant, positively or negatively, to the resolution pro-
cess. For instance, it is easy to imagine circumstances where a
complaint can be justiﬁably reconstructed as a standpoint or as a criti-
cal question. After having reconstructed all the dialectically relevant
elements of a discourse, the discourse can be evaluated by determining
to what extent the argumentative elements in the discourse do in fact
advance resolution of the diﬀerence of opinion. Argumentative contri-
butions that are only construable as violating a rule for critical discus-
sion are called fallacious.
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser have proposed to enrich this standard
pragma-dialectical methodology by integrating rhetorical insights
(1999, 2002, 2003). In their view, the reconstruction and evaluation of
a discourse is helped by understanding the discourse, not only from
the assumption that the parties are resolving their issues, but, in addi-
tion, also understanding the contributions as directed towards winning
the assent of the party addressed. An arguer or critic can best be ta-
ken as trying to achieve two things at the same time: ﬁrst, persuading
the other party, second, resolving the diﬀerence of opinion. Such stra-
tegic manoeuvring, or balancing between dialectical and rhetorical
objectives, is, in short, directed towards resolving the issue in one’s
own favour.
The dialectical and rhetorical objectives can be speciﬁed for each of
the four stages of the critical discussion procedure. I will only be con-
cerned with the ﬁrst, the confrontation stage. The notion of the con-
frontation stage can be made more precise with the help of a
dialectical proﬁle (van Eemeren et al., 2005, cf. the discussion on dia-
logue proﬁles in Walton, 1999; Krabbe, 2002 and van Laar, 2003).
In the confrontation stage of a critical discussion, the parties are
trying to ﬁnd out whether there is a diﬀerence of opinion with respect
to some issue, and if so, how this diﬀerence is to be put into words in
a way that enables its resolution in the subsequent stages. The result is
either a non-mixed diﬀerence, where one party has advanced a stand-
point and where the other party has expressed critical doubt with re-
spect to that standpoint, or a mixed dispute, where both parties have
expressed opposite standpoints (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004,
p. 60). I will restrict myself to the most elementary kind of dispute
where only one party has advanced a standpoint.
In the account of Houtlosser (2001, p. 31), a standpoint is a formu-
lated attitude, either positive or negative, with respect to an expressed
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proposition, that is then called the opinion. Adopting an attitude to-
wards a proposition is not to be understood psychologically. Instead,
it refers to the public commitment to either defend the proposition
against criticism, in the case of a positive attitude, or to refute the
proposition, in the case of a negative one. So, a standpoint has three
components: the proposition, the attitude towards the proposition and
the formulation of this attitude towards this proposition. The ﬁrst two
determine the heart and soul of the standpoint, the third is its more
contingent mode of presentation.
Two out of the ﬁfteen rules for critical discussion are operative in
the confrontation stage (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004).
According to the freedom rule for critical discussion, a party in the
confrontation stage has the unconditional right to advance any stand-
point and to adopt any critical position (p. 136). Rule 15 governs all
the four stages of a critical discussion and states that a party has the
right to request for usage declaratives, such as a deﬁnition, a clarifying
remark or a disambiguating reformulation, that a party is obligated to
a.  P1: */p/S 
b. P2: rud / S  P2: ? (*/p/S) 
c. P1: */p/S’       P1: */p/S’ P1: maintain (*/p/S)  P1: retract (*/p/S) 
 etc.        
   P2: rud / S’  P2: ? (*/p/S’)   P2: retract (?(*/p/S)) 
    etc.        etc. 
P1; P2 Party 1; party 2
*/p/S a particular (i.e. positive or negative) attitude towards proposition
p in formulation S2
? (*/p/S) expressing doubt about either the tenability of this attitude
towards the proposition as conveyed by S
maintain move by which the confrontation stage is closed (enabling the start
of the next, opening stage)
retract move by which a position is retracted (this move ends the
confrontation, but does not enable the start of the next stage)
rud request or that he wants for a usage declarative
S’ a reformulation of S, such that S’ is equally precise as or more
precise3 than S
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provide the appropriate clariﬁcations when requested to do so, and
that he has the unconditional right to provide usage declaratives, even
when there is no such request.
A dialectical proﬁle is a visual, tree-like representation of the possi-
ble ways an impeccable argumentative confrontation can develop. The
nodes represent the kinds of moves that are allowed for the parties. A
branching of arrows in n directions represents the obligation for the
next party to make a choice of exactly one of these n choices. As the
dialectical obligations are stated at an abstract level, the writer or
speaker in a real discourse needs to instantiate these slots in the proﬁle
in order to follow the dialectical rules.
In a confrontation, the protagonist makes the ﬁrst move by advanc-
ing his standpoint. The antagonist the must respond, either by request-
ing for a clariﬁcation of the standpoint, or by expressing her critical
doubt regarding the standpoint, or by withdrawing from the discus-
sion. If the antagonist has requested for clariﬁcation, the protagonist
is obligated to make his standpoint more precise. If the antagonist has
raised critical doubt, the protagonist must either make it clear that he
thinks his standpoint is in need of a clarifying reformulation, or that
he maintains his standpoint in order to conclude the confrontation
stage and to enter the next discussion stage, or that he wants to with-
draw from the discussion by retracting his standpoint. (See van Laar
and Mohammed, 2007 for a more complete treatment of dialectical
proﬁles for the confrontation stage).
With the help of this speciﬁcation of the confrontation stage, it is
possible to specify the dialectical and rhetorical aims that can be at is-
sue when parties pretend to contribute to the confrontation stage.
The main dialectical aim of following the confrontational procedure
is to externalise a possible diﬀerence of opinion in a way that furthers
its resolution. For instance, the formulation must not contain immun-
ising expressions, nor must it convey the message that the standpoint
is beyond criticism and in that sense sacrosanct (van Eemeren and
Grootendorst, 2004, p. 166). In a real discourse the individual discus-
sants are taken to be also concerned about aims that are rhetorical,
rather than just dialectical. Given the speciﬁcation of the confronta-
tion stage, the rhetorical aim of a party that is directly relevant when
he pretends to contribute to the confrontation stage, is either to make
the confrontation stage result in a formulated diﬀerence of opinion
that is favourable to his position, or to get the other party to with-
draw from the discussion.4 Consider as a case in point an antagonist
who tries to get the protagonist to choose a formulation that makes
his position look harder to defend. In the light of such rhetorical
objectives, the parties are considered to embody the roles of the pro-
tagonist and the antagonist. How will they give shape and content to
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the abstract dialectical obligations, in other words, how can the slots
in the proﬁle be instantiated in an opportune manner?
There are several levels of complexity in the devices by which a par-
ty may try to bring closer his rhetorical aim, while at the same time
keeping up the appearance of dialectical reasonableness. Van Eemeren
and Houtlosser (1999) distinguish between three aspects of strategic
manoeuvring that classify such attempts: topical choice, audience
adaptation and mode of presentation. In addition, the following three-
fold distinction may bring more clarity on the diﬀerent types of strate-
gic manoeuvring we can expect when reconstructing an argumentative
confrontation.
First, a party may come up with a contribution that can be recon-
structed as an attempt to instantiate one single slot in the confronta-
tional proﬁle. For example, a discussant may simply advance a
standpoint, or he may simply ask for a usage declarative.
Second, a party may make a contribution that can be reconstructed
as a sequence of moves in the confrontational proﬁle, in the same
manner as complex argumentation is construable as an implicit discus-
sion. For instance, a party may advance a standpoint and anticipate a
possible request for a usage declarative by giving a disambiguating
reformulation: ‘‘He is a Mussolini, I mean, he employs the same kind
of populist rhetoric.’’ This is a diﬀerent kind of manoeuvring because
if the protagonist wants to argue in a manner that is optimally strate-
gic, the anticipated move must really be instrumental for the antago-
nist’s attempt to win the discussion (Krabbe, 2001, cf. van Laar, 2007
for an application to the notion of one-sided argumentation). It would
be illegitimate, for example, to anticipate superﬂuous and pointless re-
quests for usage declaratives.
Third, a party may make a more indirect attempt to steer the
course of the confrontation stage. He can perform speech acts that, al-
though clearly relevant to the resolution process, cannot simply be
reconstructed as moves or sequences of moves in the confrontation
stage. Such manoeuvring can be dialectically reasonable or made to
look that way by appealing to the conditions for critical discussion. A
party can try to get the other party to replace a move or a sequence of
moves by arguing that these moves obstruct the resolution process be-
cause they violate a rule for critical discussion (the following of which
is considered a ﬁrst order condition for conﬂict resolution, see van
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992). Or he can try to get the other par-
ty to retract his position because a higher order condition for resolu-
tion is left unfulﬁlled. Such manoeuvring comments on how to discuss
the issue in a fruitful way and can be reconstructed as a contribution
to a procedural subdiscussion in the opening stage (cf. Krabbe, 2003
on metadialogue). Still, such manoeuvring can be aimed at inﬂuencing
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the course of the confrontation stage. For example, the antagonist
may argue that continuing the dialogue with the current formulation
of the protagonist’s standpoint is fruitless, and that the standpoint
should be reformulated or even retracted for that reason. Confronta-
tional manoeuvring by pointing out the alleged harmful consequences
of advancing a standpoint can best be analysed as such an indirect
form of manoeuvring that appeals to the appropriate conditions for
dispute resolution.
3. POINTING OUT THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF ADVANCING
A STANDPOINT
This form of confrontational manoeuvring is itself an argument. In
recent Dutch public debates about immigration and integration issues,
this kind of argumentation has played an important part, and it was
employed by several of the parties engaged in the debate. The general
pattern of reasoning goes:
Don’t say that, because advancing this standpoint has the negative consequences
C1,...,Cn.
According to a premise that is left implicit, advancing this stand-
point (at this point in time) is less desirable than avoiding its conse-
quences C1,...,Cn. This is a special application of the pragmatic
argumentation scheme (Garssen, 2001, p. 92), where an incentive or
evaluative standpoint is argued for either on the grounds of the positive
consequences of the recommended act or on the ground of the negative
consequences of the denounced act. It is special in that the incentive
standpoint concerns the dialectical act of advancing a standpoint.
This manoeuvring is not to be confused with the ad consequentiam
fallacy, where a factual standpoint is argued for by pointing out the
negative causal consequences of adopting the denial of the standpoint,
or by giving a negative evaluation of a logical consequence of it (Gars-
sen, 2006). In our form of strategic manoeuvring the standpoint is not
factual but, by deﬁnition, incentive or evaluative.
Pim Fortuyn is the Dutch politician who was murdered in May 2002
in order to stop his assumed damaging inﬂuence on society. One of his
most controversial statements was done in an interview in February
that year. The journalist’s contribution in the following exchange can
be analysed as an example of this form of strategic manoeuvring:
Fortuyn: The Islam is backward, ..., it is simply a backward culture.
Journalist: You are stirring up hatred against foreigners. (My translation.
Poorthuis and Wansink; 2002, p. 13)
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Example 1
How to evaluate this response? The aim of dispute resolution seems to
be at odds with posing any restrictions on the choice of a point of
view. Still, stirring up hatred seems to be at odds with the dialectical
ideal of critical discussion. From now on, I will search for applications
of this way of manoeuvring that are dialectically sound. I order to ﬁnd
such reasonable cases, I will need to make some distinctions and put
aside the variants that are dialectically illegitimate.
As we have seen, a standpoint is made up of a proposition, an atti-
tude and a formulation. There is an additional aspect when we con-
sider the act of advancing a standpoint: the circumstances in which the
standpoint is put forward. When someone expresses a standpoint with-
in a certain context of utterance, a critic can have four kinds of con-
cerns about negative consequences. The negative consequences can be
eﬀectuated, simply by giving presence (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca,
1969, p. 116) to that proposition, or by making it clear that the protag-
onist adopts that very attitude towards the proposition, or by convey-
ing the proposition with those linguistic means, or by doing any of
these things in these particular circumstances.
Consequently, this form of strategic manoeuvring admits of four
main variants. I will illustrate them by giving four imaginable kinds of
responses to a position that has been adopted by the Dutch columnist
Jan Blokker, who wrote that Fortuyn was ‘‘the Mussolini of the
Twenty-ﬁrst century’’ (Blokker, 2002, p. 4), a position that was soon
after advocated by the chair of the right-winged liberal party, Een-
hoorn (Spong and Hammerstein, 2003, p. 26).5
(1) The antagonist may attempt to get the protagonist to stop talk-
ing about a particular proposition. In addition he may try to get him
to talk about a (slightly) diﬀerent proposition, and express an attitude
towards that one. For instance, if the antagonist fears the conse-
quences of talking about the analogy between the Dutch politician and
Mussolini, he may try to steer the protagonist to express his views on
the politician at issue with a diﬀerent standpoint, with a diﬀerent anal-
ogy for instance.
Arguer: He is a Mussolini
Critic: Don’t make such comparisons. It will spoil the debate.
Example 2
(2) If the protagonist has expressed an attitude towards a particular
proposition, the antagonist may attempt to get him to adopt a diﬀer-
ent attitude to the same proposition.
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Arguer: He is a Mussolini
Critic: You shouldn’t say that. Your supporters are going to hate him
while his supporters are going to hate you. He is not a Mussolini.
Example 3
In the ﬁrst two variants, the antagonist tries to get the protagonist to
withdraw from the current confrontation stage, and possible to get
him to start a new one. The third and fourth variants are aimed at
changes within the confrontation stage or at continuing the confronta-
tion stage at a diﬀerent time.
(3) The antagonist may make an eﬀort to get the protagonist to
choose diﬀerent means of presentation, for example to formulate his
standpoint in a manner that is less oﬀensive.
Arguer: He is a Mussolini
Critic: Don’t be so brusque and oﬀensive.
Example 4
(4) The antagonist may try to get the protagonist to wait for diﬀerent
circumstances to either give presence to this proposition, to express
this attitude, or to use this formulation.
Arguer: He is a Mussolini
Critic: Given the heated political circumstances, this is a bad time for
making such comparisons.
Example 5
These uses of this form of manoeuvring seem to be aimed at getting
the protagonist to give a diﬀerent formulation of his standpoint, or to
wait for circumstances where such utterances are less harmful.
According to the ﬁrst rule of the pragma-dialectical procedure for
resolving diﬀerences of opinion, the parties in a critical discussion
have the unconditional right to choose any attitude towards any prop-
osition. We may presume that the ﬁrst two variants of this form of
manoeuvring violate the freedom rule for critical discussion and are
fallacious. Because here the antagonist aims at shutting out the pro-
tagonist from giving presence to a proposition or from adopting a par-
ticular attitude towards it. In other words, the antagonist acts as if the
protagonist has no other reasonable choice than to withdraw from the
confrontation stage. From the perspective of our speciﬁcation of the
confrontation stage, that is incorrect.
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There is, however, an exception to be made. The position itself
must not obstruct the resolution process by expressing its own immu-
nity from criticism or by attacking the antagonist personally. For in-
stance, suppose the protagonist advances standpoints such as
‘‘whatever I say is beyond criticism’’ or ‘‘you, antagonist, are too stu-
pid and too predisposed to have a discussion with’’. Then he makes
resolution of any diﬀerence of opinion regarding this standpoint as
good as impossible. So, the expression of a positive attitude towards
this proposition itself is fallacious and should not be advanced in a
critical discussion. With this proviso, we can rule out the ﬁrst two
variants as fallacious.
Of course, committing a fallacy by trying to get the protagonist with-
draw his standpoint can be a wise or morally good thing to do. If the
consequence of advancing a standpoint is that someone’s life becomes
threatened, you should try to get the protagonist to shut up, at least
from a moral or prudential point of view. But such a consideration does
not make the attempt logically or dialectically sound. If, on the other
hand, this form of manoeuvring is used in order to get the protagonist
to reformulate his position or to continue with the confrontation in dif-
ferent circumstances, this may, potentially, be helpful for resolving the
issue, and in that light dialectically sound. So, we will continue our
search for legitimate instances in the latter two variants only.
There is a further distinction to be made in the kind of conse-
quences that the critic appeals to. The critic may present the conse-
quences as being dialectically relevant or present them without such a
claim. For instance, the critic may allege that advancing the stand-
point, in these problematic circumstances, or presented in this contro-
versial manner, will probably lead to the termination of the discussion,
without the diﬀerence of opinion having been resolved. Crowds may
become angry and violent, and the persons who were engaged in the
debate may become too scared to vent their thoughts on the issue.
Such events would slow down or even hamper an open discussion on
the issue, and are in that sense possible consequences that are dialecti-
cally relevant.
If the antagonist points out such dialectically relevant consequences,
then the antagonist can be taken to refer to the conditions for conﬂict
resolution. Either he is pointing out that the higher order conditions
will be left unfulﬁlled, or that a rule for critical discussion is violated
by advancing the standpoint in such a way or in this context. In the
latter case, our form of manoeuvring amounts to a kind of fallacy crit-
icism (cf. Krabbe, 2002). For example, a critic may point out that by
bringing forward this standpoint, the standpoint is declared sacro-
sanct, having the consequence that all opposition is discouraged. Or he
may explain that the standpoint is formulated in an immunizing way,
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having the eﬀect that it cannot be really tested. Or that the opposition
is silenced by alluding to biases in the opposition.
Still, the consequences alluded to by the antagonist do not need to
have anything to do with the quality of the (public) discussion. For in-
stance, a critic may point out that the prime minister’s venturing a
gloomy view of the economic prospects has itself a negative inﬂuence
on the economy. Or, to take a standard ad misericordiam example, the
antagonist may point out that the teachers view on the quality of an
exam will result in his terminating his studies. A concern for the econ-
omy, or for someone’s own well-being, can be a good political, moral
or prudential reason for retracting a standpoint, but it is not a sound
reason from the perspective of resolving an issue about the economy or
the quality of an exam. When the indicated consequences are dialecti-
cally irrelevant, the manoeuvring cannot be dialectically sound. So,
from now on, I will only consider the variants where the consequences
have some dialectical relevance.
The third distinction is a more subtle one and deals with whether
the dialectically relevant consequences concern the current critical dis-
cussion, or some other possible discussion. Let’s consider an example.
According to an antagonist, advancing this standpoint stirs up hatred
against some minority group and spoils the discussion between the
supporters of the protagonist and the members of the minority group.
Suppose, the antagonist does not belong to this minority group. Then,
according to the antagonist, the protagonist does not spoil their own
discussion, but another possible discussion between the protagonist
with members of this minority group. It is possible, therefore, that the
conditions for resolution are still fulﬁlled in the current discussion.
Seen from the perspective of the current critical discussion, the antago-
nist tries to shut out the protagonist from defending his standpoint,
even though his standpoint does not harm the resolution of their dif-
ference of opinion. That makes this variant illegitimate in this discus-
sion, even though it might be legitimate in a related discussion, with
diﬀerent participants.
Suppose, on the contrary, that the consequences do involve the
antagonist. Then he may justiﬁably claim that he has become too an-
gry or too scared too continue this discussion in a fruitful way or that
the protagonist has made it diﬃcult to put the standpoint to a critical
test. The force of the antagonist’s manoeuvring then, is that the stand-
point has lead to a situation where a higher order condition for reso-
lution is no longer fulﬁlled or where a discussion rule has been
violated. So, from now on, we only consider standpoints that, accord-
ing to the antagonist, has harmful dialectical consequences for their
own critical discussion. (Of course, I am not defending that an arguer
is allowed to, for example, insult anybody outside of the narrow
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conﬁnes of one critical discussion. My position is just that from the
perspective of dialectic, doing harm to other people than one’s inter-
locutor is not in itself a fallacy in that discussion, how bad it may be
in other respects or in other possible discussions).
The fourth and last distinction is about who is responsible for the
possible dialectical damage. Given that advancing the standpoint has
undesirable eﬀects on the discussion, it is an open question who is to
be held responsible for the eﬀects. Of course, it might be the protago-
nist. He may insult his antagonist, making it psychologically hard to
critically test the standpoint. Or he may immunise his standpoint,
making it logically hard to test the standpoint. But, sometimes the
antagonist can be held responsible. Even if the standpoint’s formula-
tion or the timing of its utterance makes it psychologically impossible
for the antagonist to continue the discussion, we want in some cases
to held the antagonist responsible, for instance when we suppose him
to be oversensitive and too easily upset. In such cases the criticism is
misdirected. So, only when the protagonist is to be held responsible
for the possible harm to the discussion, this form of strategic manoeu-
vring can be legitimate.
These distinctions lead to the following four soundness conditions for
this form of confrontational manoeuvring in a particular discussion D.
1. the manoeuvring is not aimed at withholding the protagonist from giv-
ing presence to a speciﬁc proposition or from adopting a speciﬁc atti-
tude towards it, unless the position states its own ‘sanctity’ or its
immunity from criticism;
2. the manoeuvring only refers to harmful consequences that are dialecti-
cally relevant;
3. the harmful consequences pertain to discussion D, and not only to
other discussions;
4. the protagonist can be held responsible for these consequences.
In addition there are two soundness conditions that concern the im-
plicit and explicit premises:
5. that advancing the standpoint has the consequences C1,...,Cn is not fal-
sely presented as a common starting point;
6. that avoiding these consequences is preferable to advancing the stand-
point, is not falsely presented as a common starting point.
Instantiations of this form of strategic manoeuvring that do not sat-
isfy all six conditions are to be considered derailed and fallacious.
This list of soundness conditions is helpful when reconstructing the
dialectical components of contributions where an arguer is charged
with the consequences of his standpoint. Consider again example 1:
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Fortuyn: The Islam is a backward culture.
Journalist: You are stirring up hatred against foreigners.
Example 1
The journalist’s charge can be understood in such a way that the
antagonist requests the protagonist to either formulate the same po-
sition in less controversial terms, or to wait for more congenial
circumstances. It is quite plausible to attach at least some dialectical
relevance to the bringing about of hatred, for in such circumstances
we cannot expect a good discussion to unfold. However, this was a
kind of reaction that came also from non-Islamic discussants.6 The
legitimacy of the charge is partly dependent upon whether the stand-
point contains an ad hominem attack on the antagonist, or whether it
attacks only persons from outside the current discussion. The journal-
ist’s choice of words foreigners suggests that he does not charge Fortu-
yn with spoiling their current discussion, but the discussions that
Fortuyn is engaged in with the people referred to as foreigners. So,
from the perspective of resolving the diﬀerence of opinion between
Fortuyn and the journalist, and in so far as the journalist gives voice
to an antagonist that is not personally attacked by Fortuyn, this form
of strategic manoeuvring is illegitimate, because it does not satisfy
condition 3.
Two examples of potentially sound applications are the following,
even though I will still be unable to decide on its legitimacy:
Suppose the antagonist is a professed Muslim, that the protagonist advances the
standpoint that the Islam is a backward culture and, more than that, that all Mus-
lims are too backward to have a good, critical conversation with. The antagonist
then raises the objection: ‘‘Don’t say that. You ruin our discussion,’’ giving the pro-
tagonist the opportunity to reformulate his position and getting the discussion back
on track again.
Example 6
One central standpoint in Hirsi Ali’s movie Submission is that the Islam oppresses
women. Many Muslims objected that they consider the mode of presentation, by
projecting Quran texts on naked bodies, insulting and humiliating.
Example 7
The critic’s charge that the standpoint has harmful consequences
seems to satisfy the conditions 1–5. However, it remains a controver-
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sial issue whether it satisﬁes the last condition. These controversial
standpoints and these modes of presenting them, have been defended
by alluding to positive consequences, in particular to the positive dia-
lectical consequence of enabling discussions on issues that were for-
merly considered taboo. (That was also the gist of Fortuyn’s response
to the charge of the journalist).
Now that we have seen how this form of strategic manoeuvring can
be dialectically sound, we are in the position to state the apparent dia-
lectical objective of this kind of manoeuvring. The antagonist puts
forward such argumentation with the dialectical aim to arrive at a for-
mulated diﬀerence of opinion that provides a proper, workable start-
ing point for the argumentation and concluding stage of the critical
discussion. The antagonist can do this directly by putting forward the
moves that are needed to arrive at such a diﬀerence of opinion. But in
this form of manoeuvring it is done indirectly by claiming to clear up
an element that disturbs the resolution process, that is, the stand-
point’s formulation or its timing. The apparently intended result is ei-
ther that the protagonist provides a reformulation based on a usage
declarative, or continues the discussion at a diﬀerent time, or, in the
exceptional case, withdraws his position if it is inherently fallacious.
A party’s core rhetorical objective in an argumentative confronta-
tion is to make the confrontation result in a formulated diﬀerence of
opinion that provides this party with the best chances of winning over
the other party. For instance, the antagonist may expect that it will be
easier to attack a new standpoint, or a new formulation, or the same
standpoint within diﬀerent circumstances. The manoeuvring may also
serve rhetorical objectives that are less directly connected with the con-
frontation stage, for instance, when he expects that a withdrawal of
the standpoint will damage the credibility of the protagonist, as per-
ceived by the audience, and so will make it harder for him to defend
standpoints successfully to that audience.
Having stated the apparent dialectical and rhetorical goals, we can
specify what it means to manoeuvre strategically in this speciﬁc man-
ner: by pointing out the harmful consequences of advancing the stand-
point, the antagonist tries to inﬂuence the result of the confrontation
stage in his own favour, while at the same time pretending to do so in
a manner that serves the optimal unfolding of the confrontation stage.
4. CONCLUSION
This form of strategic manoeuvring easily derails, as we have seen in
the discussion on the soundness conditions. Still, even derailed sub-
stantiations of this kind of criticism can be, depending on the circum-
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stances, have the semblance of reasonableness, for at least three rea-
sons. First, this kind of criticism is brought forward with the pretence
of reasonableness. Second, there exist applications of this form of stra-
tegic manoeuvring that are dialectically legitimate. As the diﬀerence
with illegitimate applications is subtle, someone may fail to detect the
fault in a fallacious case. Third, this kind of manoeuvring takes place
in circumstances where refraining from advancing the standpoint can
be the most reasonable choice when seen from a moral or economic or
political or personal perspective. If one fails to make the distinction
between dialectical virtues and other ones, one may easily fail to see
that the charge is dialectically unsound.
NOTES
1 This paper has been made possible by the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen and by a grant of
the Netherlands Organisation for Scientiﬁc Research (NWO) for a project on strategic
manoeuvring in argumentative confrontations, led by Peter Houtlosser and Frans van Eem-
eren and carried out at the University of Amsterdam.
2 In van Laar and Mohammed (2007) a negative attitude towards p is reconstructed as a po-
sitive attitude towards the denial of p.
3 That a linguistic expression is a more precise than a linguistic expression b means that all
reasonable or common interpretations of b are reasonable or common interpretations of a
but not vice versa; that a is as precise as b means that they share all reasonable or common
interpretations (cf. Naess, 1966, p. 31).
4 When party 1 retracts from the discussion this is considered some kind of loss, even
though the other party cannot be said to have won the discussion.
5 According to Fortuyn’s laywers, this statement is part of the cause of Fortuyn’s death.
After Fortuyn had been killed, some public ﬁgures, among which Eenhoorn, have later been
charged with stirring up hatred against Fortuyn by two criminal lawyers. However, the Pub-
lic Prosecutor refused to take legal actions against them.
6 For instance, from Wallage, NRC Handelsblad, December 19, 2003.
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